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ABSTRACT Over the last decades, European cities have been facing 
serious constraints. In particular, decreasing transfers from central 
governments, the introduction of domestic ‘Stability pacts’ and the 
economic crisis have significantly challenged the capacity of local 
governments to address societal issues. Within this context, local 
governments have tried to find new ways by establishing 
collaborations with a wide range of private actors, including non-
profit organizations and the civil society as a whole. Among these 
private actors, big philanthropic organizations are gaining 
prominence, acting as public policy supporters and policy makers. In 
particular, those philanthropic organizations, which focus the 
operating activity on single communities, are emerging as potential 
key actors in local governance, thanks to their capacity to 
concentrate resourses and efforts in specific and limited territories. 
For this new emerging role, a recent debate on their impact on local 
policy making has raised in the last years. This paper aims at 
presenting the findings of a comparative analysis on the impact that 
some of the world’s biggest philanthropic organizations have 
produced in two Italian urban contexts. In particular, the 
comparative analysis of these two cases had the aim of testing a 
major thesis: the impact of philanthropic foundations on local policy 
making varies in relation to the consolidated mode of governance 
within which they operate.  
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Introduction 
 
Over the last decades, globalization has increased the difficulties for local 
governments to address public problems. Moreover, the recent austerity era has 
challenged further local governments’ ability to steer their communities (Pollitt 
2010; Lowndess and Pratchett 2012; Blom et al. 2014). This can be seen not only 
in the struggle when building new strategies for local development, but also when 
maintaining public services. As a reaction to this situation, local authorities and 
city leaders have tried to find new ways by establishing collaborations with a wide 
range of private actors, including non-profit organizations and the civil society as 
a whole (Richardson 2011; Meegan et al. 2013). As a consequence, formal and 
informal public-private partnerships are now a common way not only to promote 
long-term urban developmental agendas, but also to deliver public goods and 
services (Reynaers and DeGraaf 2014). 
 
In this scenario, together with business actors, big non-profit organizations are 
gaining prominence too, acting as public policy supporters and service providers, 
even in countries where the public sector has been dominant for decades (Knott 
and McCarthy 2007; Thuemler 2011; Pill 2013; Wang et al. 2011). In particular, 
those philanthropic organizations, which focus the operating activity on single 
communities, are emerging as potential key actors in local governance, thanks to 
their capacity to concentrate resourses and efforts in specific and limited territories 
(Anheier 2001; Knott and McCarthy 2007; Davies and Pill 2012). 
 
Philanthropic organizations have been usually analysed from a managerial or 
sociological perspective. However, because of their increasing contribution in 
several policy sectors, they also deserve to be observed from the perspectives of 
local governance and policy making (Thuemler 2011; Pill 2013). From these two 
viewpoints, the debate has just started, addressing matters like the role of 
philanthropic foundations in urban governance and their impact on local policy 
making. The present paper aims at contributing to this debate by presenting the 
findings of a comparative analysis of some of the world’s biggest philanthropic 
foundations, which operate in two big Italian cities: Milan and Turin (Anheier 
2001; Salamon 2014). The comparative analysis of these two cases had the aim of 
testing a major (neo-institutionalist) thesis: the impact of philanthropic 
foundations on local policy making varies in relation to the consolidated mode of 
governance within which they operate. Some of the literature on urban governance 
has in fact argued that the mode of governance not only affects policy outcomes, 
but also shapes the actions of the actors and, more in general, the agency 
dimension (DiGaetano and Strom 2003).  
 
The empirical enquiry has been conducted working on different sources: official 
statistics, budgets, mission reports and in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
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various policy actors (local governors, civil servants, staff of foundations) in the 
two cities.1 
The paper begins by outlining the theoretical framework. The Italian local 
governance system is then briefly presented and an overview of the FOB 
phenomenon is described in the second section. The third section illustrates the 
two urban contexts and their different governance modes, while sections four and 
five present the findings of the empirical research. The conclusion summarizes the 
main arguments of the analysis. 
 
Urban Governance, Philanthropic Foundations and Public Policies 
 
Local governments are facing hard times. Recent economic and social changes 
have generated new and diverse demands and globalization has pushed local 
governments to compete one another in order to attract capitals, companies, 
workers and consumers (Le Galès 2002; Savitch and Kantor 2002; Hambleton and 
Gross 2007; Rossi and Vanolo 2012; Sassen 2012). At the same time, the 
evolution of the demographic composition, as a consequence of domestic 
dynamics and migration flows, has favoured the diffusion of new lifestyles and the 
diversification of citizens’ needs (Glaeser and Gottlieb 2006; Turok and 
Mykhnenko 2007; Kantor and Turok 2012). Furthermore, many democratic 
countries, while progressively devolving policy responsibilities to local 
governments (Brenner 2004, Denters and Rose 2005; Lowndess and Pratchett 
2012), have introduced austerity rules, which limit local government expenditures 
(Brenner and Theodore 2002; Lowndess and Pratchett 2012; Meegan et al. 2013; 
Blom-Hansen et al. 2014; Overmans and Noordegraaf 2014). In this new era of 
complexity, the ability of local governments to solve problems is increasingly 
challenged and the economic recession has worsened the situation. 
 
Local governments can react to this condition in three ways: by selecting policy 
priorities more strictly, by changing the structure of local taxation in order to 
collect more public resources to finance policies or by activating new non-tax 
revenues (Blom et al. 2014). Because the first two options are generally seen as 
counterproductive in terms of political consensus, several local governments focus 
on the latter. Among the various strategies, the collaboration with philanthropic 
foundations is spreading, especially when these organizations have considerable 
resources at their disposal (Macdonald and Szanto 2007; Harrow and Jung 2011; 
Pill 2013). According to Pill (2013), philanthropic foundations are gaining 
prominence at local level also because of the declining presence of corporate 
actors in urban governance, especially in post-industrial cities where changes in 
the local economy has left power vacuum in the ruling class. 
 
Although the universe of philanthropy is heterogeneous, including family, 
corporate and independent foundations (Suarez and Lee 2011), all philanthropic 
foundations mainly act in two ways: through the transfer of financial resources to 
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public or private organizations for their activities, and through the realization of 
their own projects (Anheier 2001; Knott and McCarthy 2007). Mixing these two 
activities, foundations end up acting as co-producers of public goods, especially 
the ones operating at local level (Knott and McCarthy 2007; Suarez and Lee 2011; 
Thuemler 2011; Salamon 2014). This has led some scholars to define them as 
complementary actors of the State (Pill 2013). 
 
If the role of these organizations is becoming so prominent, what impact does their 
intervention produce in local policy making? The literature on the topic offers 
different views. 
 
According to some scholars, foundations have a weak impact on public policies, 
because they do not usually act as policy entrepreneurs (Knott and McCarthy 
2007; Thuemler 2011). Within this perspective, for some, foundations are 
characterized by a conservative approach, mainly concerned in maintaining the 
social order, thus providing only ‘palliative grants’ (Colwell 1993; Roelofs 2003). 
For others, foundations mainly act through symbolic or instrumental projects, to 
improve their public image and their visibility in order to gain higher social 
legitimacy (Thuemler 2011). 
 
Conversely, Clemens and Lee (2010) have argued that big philanthropic 
foundations can exert a strong bargaining power, because of their financial 
capacity and their autonomy. Consequently, they can affect the design of public 
policies and the redistribution of public expenditures. Similarly, for Gerber (2006) 
and Suarez and Lee (2011), foundations can promote innovation by carrying out 
risky projects, which governments tend to avoid (as a consequence, some 
foundations have also been called ‘policy venture capitalists’). Other researchers 
have pointed out that, in some cases, foundations’ activity has led to visible 
changes also in the consolidated policy paradigms, favouring in particular the 
adoption of neo-liberal approaches, based on less public regulation (Schoeller 
2006; Saltman 2010; Kovacs 2011). In an interesting case study on Baltimora, Pill 
(2013, 10-11) argued how the operating activity of two big philanthropic 
foundations led the local government to adopt their ‘asset-based rationale’ and 
‘asset-based discourse’ into the city housing policy. 
 
In light of the described literature, it can be said that the debate on the impact of 
philanthropic foundations on local policy making is still open. The following 
analysis aims at adding a further contribution on the topic. 
 
The Italian Fobs (Fondazioni di Origine Bancaria) 
 
Although Italian municipal governments may count on a lower share of revenue 
and expenditure than those of Northern European countries, by the end of the 
decade their financial and fiscal autonomy has increased (Bobbio 2005; ISTAT 
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2013). The sustained decentralization process has also led to a significant 
expansion of their policy-making functions, especially in social services, 
education, housing, infrastructures, public transport, environmental protection and 
economic development (Vandelli 2004; 2014). Moreover, the 1993 institutional 
reform introduced the direct election of mayors and changed the local political 
system from the mayor-council model to something similar to the strong mayor 
model. However, over the last years, decreasing money transfer from the State and 
the Regions, the introduction of the domestic ‘Stability Pact’ and the global 
economic crisis have reduced the financial resources of the municipal 
governements, inducing city leaders and public administrators to search for other 
non-tax revenues. 
 
During the ongoing process of decentralization, the Italian government 
implemented another reform: in 1990, many foundations were created after a 
process of ‘philanthropication thru privatization’ of the national banks (Salamon 
2014, 21). Many Italian banks (the so-called casse di risparmio) had a long history 
of blending philanthropy and finance, which dated back to the Renaissance. These 
banks continued to operate with this approach also after their nationalization in the 
1930s. When the national government implemented the 1990 Reform, the two 
roles were separated, maintaining the financial function for the privatized banks 
and leaving the philanthropic function to the new ‘Fondazioni di Origine 
Bancaria’ (FOBs). At the beginning, their legal nature, the corporate governance, 
the fields of action, and above all their link with the banks were not regulated by 
the national government and the foundations maintained the control (in some 
cases also the total control) of the banks and began to operate autonomously. 
 
In 1998, the national government completed the reform and established the 
features of these organizations. Firstly, the FOBs were defined as private 
organizations with financial autonomy, though limited by some rules (no risky 
financial instruments, diversification of the assets,2 no debts, public transparency 
of the investments). Secondly, the government established that their boards of 
directors had to be the expression of the main local stakeholders (public and 
private, profit and non-profit) and that the organizations had the legal obligation to 
reinvest their capital returns in specific sectors in their local communities. 
Therefore, within the foundations’ universe, the FOBs present typical traits, but 
also somewhat peculiar characteristics. They can be defined as indipendent 
foundations, because they are not owned by families or corporations and their 
operating activity melds direct intervention (the so called ‘operating model’) with 
financial transfers to other organizations (the so called ‘granting model’). 
However, they have also been considered a peculiar type of community 
foundations (Salamon 2014), because they reinvest their profits mostly in the 
urban territories in which they are located and operate in specific policy fields, 
which are established by the national Law. Similar foundations are probably the 
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fundaciones bancarias, which have been recently ruled by the Spanish 
government (Martínez Muñoz and Chapa Sánchez del Corral 2014).  
 
The 448/01 law and the 163/06 legislative decree have recently enlarged the list of 
policy sectors, which now includes almost all the local policy competences: family 
support, youth development, education and training, charity, religion and spiritual 
development, social assistance, civil rights, crime prevention, food safety and 
quality agriculture, local development, social housing, consumer protection, civil 
protection, public health, sport, scientific and technologic research, environmental 
protection, arts and culture, public works and local infrastructures. The laws have 
also established that FOBs have to concentrate at least 50% of their donations in 
no more than five policy sectors, in order to avoid an excessive fragmentation of 
the donations.  
 
According to the 2013 Report of the National Association of Foundations and 
Savings banks (Associazione delle fondazioni e delle Casse di Risparmio SpA, 
ACRI), Italy counts 88 FOBs. The landscape is heterogeneous, but some common 
traits are evident. The net assets range from two million euros to over five billion 
euros and the total donations range from 500.000 euros of the small FOBs to more 
than one hundred million euros of the biggest FOBs. However, FOBs have the 
same corporate governance (mixed boards of directors), operate mainly through 
the granting model and their donations are concentrated in six policy sectors: art 
and culture, research, social services, education, public health, and local 
development. 
 
The role of FOBs in urban policy making has been recently quesitoned in the 
newspapers and in the political arenas, mostly recalling the main arguments of the 
scientific debate. Some people state that FOBs promote just very small projects 
for voluntary organizations; others state that they support the public sector 
investing considerable resources. Some consider their activity as non influential 
on public policy making, while others underline their capacity to considerably 
affect local policies.  
 
Two Cases 
 
This section is dedicated to the description of the two main variables, which have 
been considered in the two cases: FOBs and modes of governance. 
 
While the three FOBs located in Milan and Turin have been similar in terms of 
corporate governance and operating activity, the two urban contexts have been - 
and still are - governed for a long time through a different mode of governance. 
 
Together with Genoa, Milan and Turin are two of the three cities of the old Italian 
industrial triangle. Although their local economies were somewhat different, the 
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two cities experienced a steady growth during the economic boom and have 
shared the same urban problems, with decreasing transfers from the national 
government, during the post-fordist era: poverty, social and territorial inequalities, 
immigrants’ integration, increasing unemployment rates, dramatic situation of the 
air quality, traffic and transport management problems, lack of coordination of the 
metropolitan area (Tortorella 2010; Amato et al. 2011). Many ambitious projects 
have also been promoted and implemented in both cities over the last decades, like 
the construction of new buildings, the renovation of city centres, major transport 
infrastructures, culture initiatives, and in general pro-growth policies, in order to 
steer the local development (Dematteis 2011). 
 
Furthermore, in both cities, business actors and non-profit actors have played a 
key role in promoting and supporting several policies. Among the non-profit 
actors, three of the Italy’s biggest philanthropic foundations contributed to 
promote and finance public interest projects in the urban territory: Cariplo 
Foundation, based in Milan, and Compagnia di San Paolo and CRT Foundation, 
based in Turin (tab. 1). The first two FOBs can even be considered ‘the most solid, 
rich and maybe generous per capita philanthropic investors in Europe, if not even 
in the world’ (Salamon 2014, 19). According to their annual reports, these three 
FOBs, and especially the first two, can be considered quite similar in terms of 
structure of the boards of directors, operating activity and distribution of 
resources. The members of the three boards of directors are almost equally 
composed by people nominated by (mostly local) public institutions and people 
co-opted by the incumbent members among civil society actors (mostly from the 
business sector). They have mainly operated through the granting model and their 
donations have been relatively large (more than 50% of the donations usually 
amount to 500.000 euros) and have primarily focused on arts and culture, 
research, and social assistance. 
 
Table 1: Net asset and annual donations of the ‘big’ Italian FOBs (2013)  
 
FOB 
net asset 
(million 
euros) 
donations  
(million 
euros) 
Cassa di risparmio delle Province 
Lombarde - Cariplo (Milan) 
6.624 139 
Compagnia di San Paolo (Turin) 5.664 124 
Cassa di risparmio di Verona/Vicenza 2.669 90 
Cassa di risparmio di Torino –  
CRT (Turin) 
2.069 74 
Cassa di risparmio di Padova/Rovigo 1.763 58 
Fondazione Roma 1.455 40 
Cassa di risparmio di Cuneo 1.346 24 
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Cassa di risparmio di Firenze 1.310 24 
Cassa di risparmio di Lucca 1.192 15 
Source: Annual FOBs’ reports and ACRI 2013 Report   
 
Over the last two decades, these two urban contexts have been governed through 
different modes of governance. The urban governance mode is defined by 
DiGaetano and Strom (2003) as the way in which the local public institutions 
interact with private actors in order to address urban problems. From this 
perspective, the two cases are almost opposite, because the two cities have been 
governed through a different mode of urban governance for decades (Dente, 
Bobbio and Spada 2005; Belligni and Ravazzi 2012; 2013). Turin has been 
characterized by a highly integrated mode of interaction between the local public 
administration, business actors, non-profit organizations and universities, a 
governance mode that has been defined a typical case of urban regime.3 More 
specifically, the urban governance in Turin has been defined as integrated and 
pluralistic, mainly characterized by stable informal partnerships among a large 
number of actors (Belligni and Ravazzi 2012; 2013). Conversely, Milan has been 
characterized by a more fragmented mode of governance, in which the local 
public institutions, business actors and non-profit organizations have been 
contributing to urban policies by acting mostly separately and with short-term and 
mutable collaborations (Dente, Bobbio and Spada 2005; Galimberti 2013).4  
 
The analysis has confirmed that FOBs are no exception, because the patterns of 
interaction between the three FOBs and the local public actors (mainly governors 
and civil servants) have been consistent with these different modes of governance. 
In Turin, the public administration and the two FOBs have established medium 
and long-term partnerships to co-finance several public policies and services, 
including some strategic decisions. This model has been working for decades as ‘a 
gradual construction of consesus and mutual recognition’ (I.9). As a senior civil 
servant of the Municipality of Turin stated: ‘I have been working in this division 
for more than fifteen years and I do not remember any policy sector where 
foundations have not co-produced public policies with us’. This collaboration has 
also taken place via institutionalized forms, like official agreements and 
negotiation tables. Some examples can be cited to exemplify this integrated 
model: the ‘Protocol for the development of welfare programmes’, which 
establishes the co-financing of several local welfare policies, from childcare to 
social-assistance; the informal agreement to rationalise some inefficient public-
private organizations; the working tables for social housing projects, income 
support policies and education policies.  
 
In Milan, the Cariplo Foundation and the local public administration have usually 
acted through separate paths and the seldom partnerships have concerned mostly 
single flagship projects. As a source recalled: ‘when a new mayor and a new 
council start their term, the Foundation grants the financing for a large 
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infrastructural project. In the last fifteen years, Cariplo Foundation has financed 
the renovation of four important historic buildings’ (I.3). As far as ordinary 
policies are concerned, the Foundation has been operating mainly through open 
calls on specific topics, and direct collaborations with the local government have 
taken place only occasionally. For example, for the Expo 2015, ‘the joint venture 
between the municipality and the Foundation on the urban food policy was 
established only after years that both institutions had been working on their own, 
and only after some notable people asked for their collaboration for the upcoming 
event’ (I.5). 
 
An Escape From Austerity 
 
One way of measuring how FOBs contribute to local policies is to quantify their 
money contributions to local public institutions. Unfortunately, the budgets of the 
two cities do not specify explicitly which revenues come from the FOBs or how 
much these revenues account for the total municipal revenues. According to 
official statistics, every year the three FOBs usually spend between 20% and 30% 
of their donations in favour of public institutions. However, FOBs can support 
public institutions and public policies by giving money to private organizations, 
such as private-law organizations, which are totally or partially controlled by local 
governments, and/or private ones, which stipulate outsourcing contracts with 
public institutions. These organizations then deliver services on behalf of the 
public sector.  
 
Although clear quantifications are not available, the information gathered thanks 
to interviews offers a clear picture of how much FOBs support public institutions. 
According to the civil servants, FOBs’ financial support to public policies has 
been huge in both cities. The following quotation is representative of a widely 
diffused opinion among civil servants and governors in both contexts: ‘Living in 
cities that host big foundations makes a great difference, the local government can 
benefit from a large financial support for delivering public services and producing 
public goods’ (I.6). Moreover, the same FOBs’ leaders defend their primary role 
when defining and acting for the public interest: 
There is no more hierarchy of welfare guarantors, with the government playing the 
main role and the other actors playing secondary roles. Foundations are not only 
organizations that intervene to produce goods and deliver services which the State 
does not deliver, but organizations that act to solve public problems, whose 
definition is not anymore a prerogative of the public sector and whose resolution 
can be shared with us. (I.9) 
 
In Turin, FOBs have invested mostly in the culture sector as well as in social 
policies, in order to deal with increasing poverty and unemployment. As the city 
mayor publicly stated in 2014: ‘If the foundations had not supported the 
municipality in the last years, we would not have been able to provide services 
LEX LOCALIS - JOURNAL OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
S. Ravazzi: Philanthropic Foundations and Local Policy Making in the 
Austerity Era: Does Urban Governance Matter?  
926 
 
like nurseries and kindergardens to forty-three thousand children’. An 
administrator of the Municipality tried to give a rough estimate of the financial 
support FOBs had given to local public policies over almost two decades: 
 
The foundations have been indispensable, especially in some sectors, like arts and 
culture. They have also been essential for the renovation of the city centre before 
the 2006 Winter Olympic Games. Today, FOBs’ donations for social policies 
exceed 10% of the total public expenditures of the municipality, considering both 
the funds that go through the city budget and those that go directly to finance the 
activities of the organizations involved in delivering public services, like for 
example the cooperatives which manage nurseries and kindergardens. (I18) 
 
A recent official agreement, signed by the Municipality of Turin and one of the 
two FOBs, states that ‘the intervention of the foundations helps reinforce the 
cooperation between the public and the private sector and protects public policies 
in a particularly acute phase of crisis’. 
 
Also in Milan, the Cariplo Foundation has invested huge resources to support 
public policies. Among the various policy areas, its main focus has been culture, 
supporting most activities in the city, from financing theaters and museums to the 
support of specific projects. As one interviewee said: 
Civil servants and politicians who do not live in Milan say ‘lucky you, because 
you have such a big foundation investing in your city!’. As far as the cultural 
activities are concerned, the foundation is everywhere. Its support to this sector is 
so widespread that nobody can disregard it. Almost every cultural activity and 
project has the Cariplo logo on it. (I.6) 
 
The role of FOBs is considered so important, especially in periods of austerity, 
that some people define them ‘countercyclical’ organizations. This because of 
their relative financial stability, which they have thanks to the diversification of 
the investments in low-risk funds and bonds, and their budget flexibility, which 
they have thanks to their private-law nature and their autonomy from politics. 
 
Fobs and Public Policy: Urban Governance Matters 
 
As mentioned in the first section, the debate on the impact of the philanthropic 
foundations on public policies has raised two main issues: 1) whether they foster 
policy change in public policy making and 2) whether these policy changes can be 
considered somewhat paradigmatic, in terms of diffusion of specific policy 
approaches or policy styles. This analysis suggests that the answer to the first 
question is positive, but with significant differences between the two urban 
governance models; while the question about paradigmatic changes cannot be 
answered univocally and it would need a deeper study on a wide sample of 
policies. 
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In Turin, FOBs have a ‘recognized role of facilitation of innovation processes 
within the public institutions’ (I.23) and the integrated mode of interaction 
between them and the public administration has led to co-design processes of new 
complex policy tools for large numbers of beneficiaries. Several examples could 
be cited with regard to various policy sectors: among them, a new system of 
public-private education services, several neighbourhood requalification projects, 
a new integrated system of public-non-profit services for children entertainment, a 
joint project for the implementation of the social card, a new public-private 
development agency that should integrate all the activities to boost local 
development, a joint project to support evicted families. Some of these policies 
have been co-produced through triple partnerships, involving the public 
administration and both FOBs. 
 
One interesting case can exemplify how the strict collaboration between municipal 
staff and FOB staff has led to the construction of a complex policy for a big target 
population. A new joint programme for income support was co-designed, co-
financed and co-implemented by one of the two FOBs and the local government at 
the end of the 2000s. It consisted of vouchers for low-income workers who were 
constrained to temporarily suspend their work and were benefitting from the 
Italian social security ‘Cassa Integrazione Guadagni’ (CIG). The National 
government pays a percentage of the salary to CIG workers, but the subsidy is 
often too little for minimum salary workers. The joint programme was designed to 
offer these workers the opportunity to integrate their income by doing ‘auxiliary 
work’ in non-profit organizations and associations in the city. A civil servant 
explained how the FOB was determinant in favouring the formulation of this new 
policy: 
The innovative aspect of this programme is the particular combination between 
private and public. The foundation pays for the vouchers, while non-profit 
organizations have to look for the workers who may be suitable for the auxiliary 
work. This strategy was proposed by the foundation, in order to use the already 
existing networks of many non-profit organizations. The public personnel 
intervene in the selection phase. The organizations have to apply with proposals of 
auxiliary work and the civil servants select the most convincing ones, also 
checking whether the workers identified by the organizations meet the established 
income criteria. The municipality also gives support to the targeted organizations 
by providing suggestions about contracts and health-and-safety measures. Finally, 
civil servants monitor the implementation phase periodically, checking the activity 
of each worker who has benefitted from the voucher, while the foundation keeps in 
touch with the non-profit organizations. The idea of this integrated combination 
between public and private is the result of an intense collaboration between the 
public administration and the Foundation. 
 
In Milan, the public administration and the Cariplo Foundation have been 
operating following two parallel tracks and only a few co-productions of policies 
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have taken place over the last decades. Every year, Cariplo Foundation publishes a 
certain number of calls, which is open to public and private organizations. The 
Municipality sometimes applies to them with and only rarely interacts with the 
FOB through direct channels. Also this way of working on parallel tracks has led 
to several policy changes, but they have been more sporadic and not risky 
innovations. As a Cariplo manager briefly said: 
We formulate various policy tools and implement small-scale pilot projects, which 
we think could be useful and innovative, and we do this by ourselves. Through all 
these initiatives, we can attract the attention of public policy makers. (I.5) 
 
A recent example of this pattern was the call for public libraries which was 
launched by Cariplo Foundation in 2010. The goal of this call was to co-finance 
new social coesion activities promoted by public libraries in partnership with non-
profit organizations. Many libraries applied for the call and some of them obtained 
access to the funding scheme. Four years later, after the implementation of this 
policy had produced the first results, the Municipality started the same project for 
the municipal libraries that had not benefited from FOB’s call.  
 
These different policy-change patterns have been the result of quite different 
processes. In Turin, the aforementioned co-design and co-implementation 
activities have taken place mostly through slow trial-and-error processes. Civil 
servants and FOBs staff designed tools using incremental processes and reframing 
them several times during the implementation phases. As a office administrator of 
the City of Turin said: ‘we initiated several joint projects years ago and thereafter 
we have intervened many times to improve them or simply to better adapt them to 
our different viewpoints’ (I.14). In Milan, the processes have taken place mainly 
through ‘policy punctuations’ and mostly by transfering effective FOB’s projects. 
According to a FOB manager, the aforementioned example of the library call is 
emblematic: 
Only when the municipality thinks that a project is working well and does not cost 
too much in terms of new investments or current expenditure, we manage to have 
an impact on the public administration. (…) As far as the library project is 
concerned, the municipal administration observed the implementation of the 
project for some years and, when they thought that the project was producing good 
results, they launched the same programme. 
 
Moreover, in the two cities FOBs’ donations have mostly followed different trails. 
In the integrated governance of Turin, FOBs have provided a considerable direct 
support to the local public administration, although with variable intensity over the 
years and between the two FOBs. Most donations have been granted on condition 
that the Municipality would have used the money for the specific projects, 
activities or services formulated with the FOBs. However, for a large part, the 
money went through the local government coffers. On the contrary, the donations 
of Cariplo Foundation have been only indirectly offered to the local public 
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administration, by financing activities of public and private organizations which 
delivered services on behalf of the Municipality. A FOB manager strongly 
claimed the importance of this indirect system by saying that ‘putting money 
directly into the municipal coffers would undermine our existence’ (I.4). An 
example can better explain the functioning of this targeted funding. The national 
government has recently changed the spending criteria of the ‘National Fund for 
Cultural and entertainment activities’ and the Municipality of Milan has to adapt 
to these new rules. By explaining a hypothetical new call of Cariplo Foundation in 
the culture sector, the statement of another FOB manager highlights how this 
indirect support approach works: 
With the new national regulation, the municipality of Milan will probably act 
more selectively and it will concentrate most funds on the most important theatres 
and music institutions. As a consequence, we will consider the option of 
concentrating our financial contributions on small cultural institutions’ (I.5).   
 
Figure 1 illustrates the main traits of these two models of FOBs’ impact on local 
policy making. 
 
Figure 1: FOBs’ impact on local policy making 
 
Turin Milan 
co-design of complex policies for separated formulation of policies 
money transfers to the municipal 
coffers 
grants to organizations which deliver 
public 
co-implementation of policies 
 
Municipal monitoring of projects or 
services financed by 
  
diffused policy changes through 
trial-and-error processes 
sporadic policy punctuations through 
transfers of ‘best practices’ 
 
These different patterns have had some main consequences. In Turin, the local 
public administration, which has been frequently negotiating with FOBs, has been 
less autonomous in its policy choices. At the same time, though, it has also 
benefited from the direct money transfers into the municipal coffers, substantially 
maintaining the control on important aspects of complex and large implementation 
processes; for example, the selection of the target population, the procedures and 
rules of the policy and service implementation, the monitoring activities. In Milan, 
the local public administration has been less directly influenced by Cariplo 
Foundation, but FOB’s financial support to service-delivery organizations has 
allowed it to directly intervene in the choices of the financed organizations and 
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has led the local government to slightly reduce its intervention in sectors where 
FOB’s financial support had been strong and consolidated. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Economic crisis and austerity measures have affected national governments 
significantly, but even more local governments, which are becoming more 
vulnerable and less able to address societal issues. Today, in fact, these are 
struggling not only to steer local development, but also to maintain consolidated 
policies and services. Within this critical scenario, public-private partnerships are 
increasing and, among them, the collaboration with philanthropic foundations is 
gaining prominence. 
 
The collaboration with philanthropic foundations has not yet been analyzed from a 
public policy perspective, since these public-private partnerships are somewhat 
new in many countries, but the matter is relevant, especially when big foundations 
concentrate their money and resources in specific local communities (Salamon 
2014). This is the case of young Italian FOBs, some of which are among the 
biggest philanthropic organizations in the world and concentrate most of their 
profits in several medium and large cities. 
 
In this paper, two urban contexts that host big FOBs were compared with the aim 
of contributing to the debate on the impact that these foundations have on local 
policy making: Milan and Turin. The former has mostly been characterized by a 
fragmented and separated mode of governance, in which the local FOB and the 
public administration have interacted only through rare short-term collaborations, 
while the latter has been governed by an urban regime, in which the two FOBs 
have established long-term and stable partnerships with the local public 
administration. 
 
The analysis has shown that the three FOBs have strongly supported both local 
public institutions over the last two decades, offering extraordinary resources 
through direct financing and through public interest activities and projects. Their 
particular nature, which depends on a mix of public regulation, private 
management, philanthropic mission and community representation, has made 
them somewhat countercyclical in an era of economic crisis and austerity 
measures imposed to local governments at national level. 
 
Moreover, in both cities, FOBs’ intervention has produced changes in public 
policies of both local governments, but their impact has varied in relation to the 
consolidated mode of governance within which they have operated.  
 
When looking at Turin and its integrated governance, the repeated and stable 
collaborations of the public administration with the two FOBs has led to the co-
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production (joint formulation and implementation) of complex policies for large 
numbers of beneficiaries, through considerable direct money transfers from FOBs 
to the municipal coffers. This system has generated diffused and mostly 
incremental policy changes in the public administration, mainly through trial-and-
error processes during the implementation phases. This pattern has in some way 
weakened the decisional autonomy of the public administration in the formulation 
phase, but it has also allowed it to maintain the control on important 
implementation processes. 
 
On the contrary, in the fragmented governance of Milan, the parallel tracks 
followed by the two institutions have been evident both when considering the 
almost absent co-production processes of public policies and the mostly indirect 
money trails from the FOB to the local public administration. This system has led 
to sporadic policy punctuations in public policies, which have been happening 
mainly through the replication of those FOB’s pilot projects, which had been 
monitored and evaluated as best practices by the Municipality. Within this 
separated mode of governance, the local public administration has preserved its 
autonomy in the design, formulation and implementation of the policies, but, at 
the same time, it has also de facto led the public expenditures to slightly shrink in 
sectors where FOB’s financial support was strong and consolidated. 
 
 
Notes: 
1 Some quotations will only be marked with numbers, as requested by the interviewees, 
who wish to remain anonymous. 
2 According to the National Association of Foundations and Saving banks (2013 Report), 
today FOBs hold an average of 38% of bank shares, although both the shares and the net 
assets of the banks vary significantly. 
3 According to a recent review on urban governance, the collaborations between public and 
private actors that characterize urban regimes tend to be more pervasive, stable and in some 
cases also institutionalized than those of other urban governance modes (Pierre 2014). 
4 The matter of why these two cities have experienced different modes of governance is not 
the object of this paper and the causes could be numerous. Among those, the political 
colour of the governmental majority does not seem to have had a particular influence. 
While Turin has been governed by a leftist government for two decades, Milan has had 
rightist governments until 2011, when a new left-wing coalition won the elections. 
However, according to the interviews, the mode of governance has not been shifted toward 
a more integrated model after this political change. 
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